Legitimizing the Upcoming Duma Elections: Tactics of a Virtual Democracy

With the recently highly publicized remarks by Putin that the US is behind the OSCE’s decision not to send observers to watch the Russian elections (Russia had already limited OSCE’s participation in the beginning), there appears to be a major push in Russia to ensure a massive turnout to legitimize the elections in the eyes of world.

Gazeta.ru has reported on the massive television coverage of the elections – election news, encouragement to vote, and information will be beamed out on all the major Russian television stations all day on Sunday, December 2 (election day). http://gazeta.ru/politics/elections2007/articles/2352008.shtml

Newsru.com is reporting on the potential use of absentee ballots in the upcoming election to further boost the percentages of voter turnout.

One of the most interesting examples of incentives to vote (and to vote for United Russia) is reported in another Gazeta.ru article. A teacher in a school in northern Moscow (who wishes to remain anonymous) reports on a potential “cultural excursion” to Konstantinovo – a village where the poet Esenin lived. Solovev, a member of the social fund, described how it will be organized for all teachers who get an absentee ballot (*this is the only requirement to go). He said there is no requirement of voting for United Russia, but strongly suggests that the teachers decide to vote for United Russia.

The extent of the program is stunning (and shows that the government is taking this election very seriously).

He described: "The program will be like this. There will be a Mercedes bus. It is very comfortable. We will leave at 7 am. Everyone should have an absentee ballot - that is the basic rule....we will arrive in Konstantinovo. At first there will be an excursion. Then we will go to the restaurant. There you can have vodka, wine, or champagne...the more people who attend the better. If there are 40 people that is great. If there a 20 - not bad. if there are 500, even better."

Clearly government oil money is being spent liberally on this election.

A key point that is made in the Gazeta.ru article: The perception that many of these tactics are a change from the elections in the 1990s (which are considered in the western mind as the golden age of democracy) are flawed. These same media manipulation tactics (and some others) were widely used by Yeltsin to shore up support for the Constitution (in the referendum of 1993) and to defeat the Communist party in 1996 (who Sean at Sean's Russia Blog rightly points to as the real opposition to United Russia in the upcoming elections). For more on this, see Andrew Wilson's trenchant book entitled Virtual Politics.

Russian-Ukrainian Gas War Again?

Turkmenistan has become a new player in the Russia-Ukrainian gas pricing game.

It is reaching the end of the year and, unsurprisingly, once again Russia (through its subsidiary Gazprom) is using control of the supply of natural gas to exert influence over its neighbors (generally referred to as pipeline politics). Indeed, natural gas is one of the chief tools inherited from the Soviet period and one that was not dismantled amidst the privatizations of the 1990s (where oil was - it has only been recently that the Russian state has once again sought to gain control over the oil industry - the attempt to expand Rosneft and the destruction of Yukos).

This time the deal is with Turkmenistan - an emerging gas power now that Niyazov (who vaingloriously called himself Turkmenbashi) has died. In fact, as I have pointed out in previous posts, Ukraine relies on Turkmen natural gas for many of its needs (much of this gas has been shipped through Ukraine using Rosukrenergo). Anyway, Gazprom has reached a deal with the Turkmen side to increase the price of gas for the Ukrainians.

This deal serves two purposes for the Russians:

1. it is potentially a large blow to Ukrainian industry and will more than likely force a response from the newly elected Timoshenko-Yushchenko "orange" alliance. It will be interesting to watch - will the Ukrainians once again use their control of Russian gas pipelines to Europe to make up the difference?

2. It further cements a Russia-Turmenistan relationship. Since the death of Niyazov, control of Turkmeni gas has become a new prize in the competition (between China, US, and Russia) for influence in Central Asia and this is a powerful statement that Russia is doing well (China has also been successful, leaving the US as the odd man out recently in securing influence and hydrocarbon resources in the area). In particular, the US has been trying to secure a non-Russian pipeline route for gas out of central Asia. This deal has to be seen as a blow to those interests.

Here is an article with more details on this deal. .

New Shadow Government or Just More Pre Election Agitation for a United Russia Supermajority?

In Tver today, an assembly of delegates from across Russia gathered to call for Putin to be the national leader. Behind closed doors for much of the time, this highly scripted act of political theater is a bid to provide Putin with a support base independent of the government (and of the Presidential administration which could turn on him), in order to shore up his power (and reduce the options of his successor as President) when Putin steps down from the Presidency in March 2008. Interestingly, Pavel Astakhov - a lawyer - who has become increasingly prominent in Putin's recent attempts to build post-presidential legitimacy, pointed out that all options are still on the table for Putin: prime minister, head of the Constitutional Court, or chief Prosecutor (Attn general equivalent). Furthermore, a large theme in this whole campaign is preserving the integrity of the Russian constitution, so it now seems less and less likely that the Russian constitution will be changed.

In a related story, the opposition parties in Russia are fighting back against what they see as illegal pre-election campaigning by Putin for United Russia . In a growing reflection of the increasing personification (or, better said, Putinization) of politics in Russia, the Union of Rightist Forces are filing a claim personally against Putin for two charges.

1. They are charging Putin with responsibility for the harassment they are undergoing from police and law enforcement in the lead up to the election (they allege that campaign material is being seized, their freedom is being impaired, etc. in a coordinated move by the law enforcement under the watchful eye of Putin).

2. They charge Putin with illegal pre-campaign agitation for United Russia.

Two Good Reader Questions Answered

In general, I encourage questions on this blog and others as it is important for the English language blogging community to think about these issues, read each others blogs, and engage in a dialogue. As a result, I will give my thoughts on two good questions posed by readers -

First, Ash asks: "What is your take on Kasparov".

I think that Kasparov has little chance of winning and is more of a factor in the western press than in Russia at the moment. I am also worried by the coalition that he has assembled (see my previous post on its association with fringe, neo nazi, anti-kremlin groups).


Second, Jesse Heath asks:
"What is best for Russia at this point? I myself am at a loss - it would be nice if [strong] democratic institutions sprung up in the next several months, but this is wishful thinking. I think the best result is for Putin to become PM. All this 'Putin for Tsar' business is coming from entrenched interests worried about where their income sources will go under a [*****] Administration. A balancing of the Executive and Legislative branches could result from a Putin prime ministership, though he will surely be roundly criticized for doing this (but won't he be criticized no matter what he does?)."

I think that the real struggle for power is going on within the Kremlin right now regarding positioning for the post-Putin presidency. I do think that currently the Kremlin is leaving a few options on the table - one of which is Putin not stepping down (my guess is that no one expected the instability that has arisen from Putin's departure from the Presidency). Evidence of the fact that a third term is still in the cards is the increasing number of staged meetings (Putingi as they are being called) where people are lobbying for a third term. Also, there still has been no mention of a successor - time is growing short and I do think that the Kremlin (and Putin) are keeping their options open in order to be able to respond to events.

Overall, I think in the long term Russia is better off (in terms of long term stability) strengthening its institutions and if Putin were able to take up the Prime MInistership and use his supermajority in the Duma to amend the constitution to strengthen the Duma (and weaken the Presidency), I think that Russian institutions would be more stable and less subject to executive capture. This is unlikely, though, and I think it much more likely that Putin will seek to use informal power (perhaps by convening one of these old Tsarist land assemblies) to ratify Putin's Plan and ensure his position as a national leader. Furthermore, there is more evidence now to suggest that Putin is undermining the legitimacy of institutions in Russia by continuing to strengthen the cult that surrounds him. As to the cult, its worth visiting a website called "For Putin" (Za Putina) which seems to be coordinating much of this Putin cult. It struck me as stylishly put together and beautifully designed - there is no doubt that this administration is learning quickly the power of the web and web video (and using these tools to promote Putin).

Putin as the National Leader: A Solution to Russia's Political Instability?

As Russia hurtles ever closer to the Parliamentary elections in December and then Presidential elections in March, 2008, uncertainty is high. Presidential succession is still very much in doubt and numerous rallies are being held (organized??) around the country calling on Putin to remain as the national leader and to continue to pull Russia out of her time of troubles.

There have been increasing calls to install Putin as a pseudo-Tsar, ruling outside the traditional institutional power structure through a National Assembly (grazhdanskii sobor) which will adopt as its ruling power base UNited Russia and as its chief legitimating document Putin's Plan. This kind of Assembly (sobor) has deep roots in history: it is the same kind of assembly that elected Mikhail Romanov as Tsar in 1612 after a period of international involvement and chaos in Russian history (many Russians see the 1990s as another such time and they fear that Russia without Putin will once again fall into this trap...). Putin's success in ruling has made him indispensible - he has made himself the only arbiter between competing factions within the Kremlin and he commands loyalty amongst the people (part in due to his growing cult). If he were truly to step down a large scale power vacuum would open up and there would be significant instability.
In this way, Putin's success has also made Russia more instable - hence, now, all of the questions about a new institution that will rival the power structure of the Presidency.

However it turns out, Russia is now highly unstable and the powers that were once established are beginning to erode - the next 6 months will be critical in determining yet again the institutional break down of power in Russia.

Here is a description of the National Assembly idea from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .

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On November 6, Unified Russia posted on its website an article that further lays out the Mikhail Romanov scenario. The piece argues for the calling of a Public Assembly shortly after the Duma elections, at which representatives of grassroots organizations would anoint Putin as the country's "national leader." According to the piece, the public has no confidence in the political process or political parties and only such a Public Assembly would have the legitimacy to effect the radical political change the country needs. Unified Russia is in the process of drafting a "Pact of Civil Unity" that could be adopted at such an assembly. That pact will "formulate the institution of the national leader as the basic element of a new configuration of power."

If the Kremlin's plan (whichever one is finally put into action in March 2008) succeeds and Putin is installed as the country's leader for the foreseeable future, the 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution will likely be treated entirely differently. In 2012, Russia will mark the 400th anniversary of the end of the Time of Troubles, presumably in the 12th year of Putin's reign. In 2017, when the centennial of the Bolshevik Revolution rolls around, there will likely not be even any rump communist enthusiasts around to mark it.

With the problem of political succession solved, the state's need to play up the possibility of "troubles" will disappear; the need increasingly to celebrate the regime that ended the troubles and lifted the country off its knees will grow stronger. A system that derives its legitimacy from a trumped-up groundswell of popular support and a stage-managed Public Assembly will have a hard time resisting maintaining its grip on power by a combination of fear and a stultifying cult of personality. Russian history offers models for this as well.

Nationalism in Russia

A recent informal political debate that was supposed to pit an SPS member (Maria Gaidara) and a United Russia representative (who never showed up) devovled into violence at the end. A member of Yabloko (Apple), the liberal political group was shot in an ensuing fight. This incident suggests a dangerous trend in Russia: the growing alliance between ultra nationalist groups and the "liberal" opposition to the Kremlin. See the following report from the anti-nationalist group Sova .


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Another disturbing tendency - suggesting some sort of «the Kondopoga effect» - was a lack of uniform position among the liberals concerning "acceptable boundaries of xenophobia.» So for example, in September, the Karelia branch of Garry Kasparov’s United Civil Front (UCF) ex-pressed virtual solidarity with perpetrators of pogroms in Kondopoga by praising their actions as a "manifestation of civic self-government." Notably, the UCF leaders - even though civil society ac-tivists specifically tried to draw their attention to unacceptability of such pronouncements - failed to respond to, or denounce, the statement of their members in Karelia.

In November, a scandal broke out involving Alexei Navalny, a leader of the Yabloko Party Moscow branch who reportedly attended a meeting of the Russian March organizing committee as an observer. While there is nothing wrong with «observing» any phenomena, Navalny also said publicly that he did not denounce any of the Russian March slogans. And while Deputy Chair of the Yabloko Party Sergey Ivanenko responded with a critical statement, his promise to «look into» the incident remained a mere declaration.

The Yabloko leadership also failed to respond to the ads Russia for [ethnic] Russians! and For Democracy! For the Power of [ethnic] Russians! posted by Vladimir Abrosimov, their regional party leader in Krasnoyarsk, on an office building in the city.

Admittedly, the argument about the extent and forms of patriotic and nationalist slogans (with the boundaries between them often unclear) acceptable to liberals is far from new. But the Russian March brought these debates to the foreground. In particular, there was an ambivalent re-action to the fact that SPS leader Nikita Belykh finished his address to the anti-fascist meeting on 4 November with words Long Live Russia!

Equally debatable and relevant in the context of increasingly active nationalism is a question about boundaries and principles concerning relationships with nationalists of various types. This question was actively discussed following A. Belov’s participation in political debates organized by the Democratic Alternative and chaired by the mentioned A. Navalny.

Nonetheless, on 20 November, a round table on Civil Society and Protection of Russian People’s Rights held in the Realists Club attracted leading representatives of democratic forces, such as Alexander Auzan and Georgy Satarov, who came to mingle with right-wing radicals rang-ing from Dmitry Rogozin to Andrei Savelyev and Alexander Belov. UCF leader Garry Kasparov sent a welcome letter to the participants of the roundtable, while other public figures, such as Lyudmila Alexeyeva, third co-chair of the Other Russia and the All-Russian Civil Congress, re-fused to attend a meeting with Rogozin.