Constitutional Meaning in Russia: Limiting or Legitimizing the Russian State?

One of the major decisions of the last year or so in Russia has been Putin's decision to step down from the presidency, resist the temptations to change the Constitution, and decline to take up a third term. On its face, this would suggest that the Constitution is an influential document in Russian political life. Yet, its legitimacy has been challenged by some in the past, much of which is based on the Constitution's checkered past. In fact, the Russian Constitution is widely considered by many constitutional experts as a bloodstained document: it was pushed through by the Yeltsin government after he had forcibly disbanded the Russian Congress (by sending the military into the Russian congress) and then dismissing the Russian constitutional court after they had declared Yeltsin's actions unconstitutional.

And, despite the Putin presidency's attempts to jettison much of their inheritance from the Yeltsin-era 1990s - including pluralism, influential oligarchs, decentralization - Putin has embraced the Constitution. He often speaks of the importance of constitutional order in Russia. In fact, he has taken the Constitution and given it a distinctly Putinist (and un-western) interpretation: for Putin (and those in his sovereign democracy movement - an ideology that preaches a strong, proud state apparatus), the Constitution does not limit the government (as our Constitutions do in the West) but instead legitimates the government, strengthening the state (the constitutions during the Soviet period played this kind of role). In this way, the Constitution is therefore a critical part of Putin's state centric approach to politics (everything that Putin and his supporters have done in the last 8 years has been aimed at strengthening the Russian state: from the well publicized arrest of Khordorkovsky and the destruction of Yukos to his less well publicized decision to adopt a pro-market flat tax and engage in serious legal reform (unlike Yeltsin, whose legal reform policies were a failure and half baked)).

Does the average Russian see the constitution in the same way? For its not just the elite, but also the people who give a constitution meaning...

The Levada center has surveyed Russians over the last 10 years asking them whether they agree with the following questions about the Constitution.


1. The Constitution guarantees the rights and freedom of citizens [essentially this is the western view of constitutions].

1997: 12%
2002: 21%
2003: 14%
2005: 21%
2007: 31%

2. The Constitution guarantees order in the activities of the state [here we have a classic statement of the Putinist view of constitutions]

1997: 20%
2002: 22%
2003: 25%
2005: 22%
2007: 30%


One thing is clear: we can see that the Constitution is becoming more relevant to the average Russian under the Putin years. In fact, the year after Yeltsin's election (1997), almost half of Russians (46%) said that the constitution does not play any role in their life because "no one even considers it." But in 2007, the polling suggests that this number has dropped to 21%. Some of this drop can be attributed to Putin: in particular, his decision to step down from the Presidency has shown the average Russian that the Constitution has a tangible affect on the leader of Russia.

We can also see that both the views of the constitution as a document that is focused on human rights and freedom and one that is focused on enabling the state to act legimately are on the rise in Russia. Whether there is a tension between these views is another question - maybe they will slowly converge, maybe not. But this split in the interpretation of the Russian constitution suggests a hybrid form of constitutionalism that suggests an counter intuitive conclusion: Putin has succeeded in enhancing respect for the Constitution in Russia but this constitutional respect is divided between those who see the constitution as a limit on government and those who see it as a enabler for government. As the Russian state grows increasingly powerful, the real struggle will be fought by those who see the constitution as a limiting factor. Will this human rights view of the constitution grow in influence as it becomes clear that the problems of a weak state in the 1990s are a distant memory and Russians realize that the new threat to their security is not chaos, devaluations, and a crumbling state apparatus, but instead overbearing state power?